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Fry v. Angelone
No. 98-8, 1998 WL 746859
(4th Cir. Oct. 26, 1998)

L FactsI
On February 21, 1994, Tony Leslie Fry ("Fry") murdered Leland A.
Jacobs ("Jacobs"), an automobile salesman, by shootingJacobs eleven times
and dragging him behind the Ford Explorer which Fry and his accomplice,

Brad Hinson, planned to steal during a test drive.2 Fry pled guilty to capital
murder, robbery, and two counts of illegal use of a firearm before a Chesterfield County Circuit Court judge.3 The judge sentenced Fry to death based
upon Virginia's "vileness" aggravating factor.4
On direct appeal before the Supreme Court of Virginia, Fry claimed
only that his sentence was excessive and disproportionate to sentences in
similar cases.' The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the conviction and
sentence and the United States Supreme Court denied Fry's petition for
certiorari. 6 Fry then filed a petition for state habeas relief, raising nine
claims, 7 which the Supreme Court of Virginia summarily denied! Fry next
1. This is an unpublished disposition which is referenced in the "Table of Decisions
Without Reported Opinions" at 165 F.3d 18 (4th Cir. 1998).
2. Fry v. Angelone, No. 98-8, 1998 WL 746859, at *1 (4th Cir. Oct. 26, 1998), cert.
denied, 119 S.Ct. 921 (1999). Tony Leslie Fry was executed by the state of Virginia on
February 4, 1999. Frank Green, Fry Executedfor Killing CarSalesman, Richmond TimesDispatch, Feb, 5, 1999, at BI.
3. Fry, 1998 WL 746859, at *1.
4. Id. See VA. CODE ANN. S 19.2-264.2 (Michie 1998). In this case, the finding of
"vileness" was based upon the theory that Fry's conduct constituted an aggravated battery
to the victim.
5. Fry, 1998 WL 746859, at *1.
6. Fry v. Commonwealth, 463 S.E.2d 433 (Va. 1995), cert.denied, 517 U.S. 1110 (1996).
7. Fry, 1998 WL 746859, at *1. Fry's nine claims were as follows:
(1)Virginia's capital sentencing statute was unconstitutional as applied; (II) the
sentencing court adopted an unconstitutional presumption in favor of death and
used an unauthorized weighing system for sentencing- (IM.)the court unconstitutionally considered unadjudicated criminal conduct Auring sentencing; (IV) the
Supreme Court of Virginia conducted inadequate appellate review; (V) statements
made by Fry after he was taken into custody were improperly introduced into
evidence during the penaltyphase; (VI) Fry was denied constitutionally effectve
assistance of trial and appelate counsel; V the Supreme Court of Virginia
failed to require counseli submit a brief m compliance with Anders v. Caf.
nia,386 U.S. 738 (1967); (VIII) Virginia disproportionately and discriminatorily
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petitioned the federal district court for federal habeas relief. The district
court concluded Fry's ineffective assistance of counsel claim had no merit
and that all other claims were procedurally barred from federal review.' Fry
then appealed to the Fourth Circuit."°
II. Holding
The Fourth Circuit
denied Fry a certificate of appealability and dis1
missed his petition.
IMI. Analysis lApplication in Virginia
A. Denialof Trial and Appellate Assistance Claim
For purposes of this section, only one claim will be analyzed: Fry's
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 2 At federal habeas Fry made a
claim of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, citing a failure
to raise any appellate issues on direct appeal." Fry argued that appellate
counsel's failure to raise any claim on appeal was the equivalent to a withdrawal. 4 Withdrawal requires the filing of an Anders brief discussing
possible appellate issues and reasons why those issues were meritless."
Fry's federal habeas counsel's argument can be simplified to an either/or
argument: either appellate counsel's actions essentially equaled a withdrawal, and therefore an Anders brief was required, or the appellate counsel's actions did not constitute a withdrawal and appellate counsel failed to
provide effective assistance to Fry by failing to raise any appellate issues on
direct appeal. 6 The result of either circumstance would have resulted in
applied the death penalty to Fry; and (IX) the death penalty is cruel and unusual
pinishment.

Id.
8. Id., at *2.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11.
Id., at *5.
12.
See supra note 7 (the ineffective assistance of counsel claim is listed as "VI"). The
other claims that Fry presented at the federal habeas level were found to be procedurally
defaulted, although the 4th Circuit did address the merits of some of these claims in
conclusory fashion.
13. Fry, 1998 WL 746859, at *4.
14. Id.
15. Id. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) (stating that when appointed
appellate counsel wishes to withdraw from a case, counsel must first submit a brief to his
client and the court outlining all possible appellate issues, the court must then give the
defendant an opportunity to raise any further issues, and the court must find that all appellate
issues would be frivolous if brought on appeal).
16. Fy, 1998 WL 746859, at *4-5.
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error: either a contradiction of United States Supreme Court precedent,17
or a violation of the Sixth Amendment constitutional right to counsel at
trial and on direct appeal.
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with this reasoning, first stating that Fry
misapplied Anders because counsel did not withdraw, and second by citing
appellate counsel's brief and argument concerning the Supreme Court of
Virginia's proportionality review as ample assistance to Fry during his direct
appeal process." The court disregarded the Supreme Court of Virginia's
statutory requirement to provide proportionality review whether or not a
brief regarding proportionality review is submitted by the defendant. In
fact, the court applauded trial counsel's strategic choice in presenting, what.
counsel considered, the strongest appellate issue. 9
While discharging Fry's ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
Fourth Circuit offered some advice to counsel on how to prepare issues for
appeal. The court stressed "the importance of winnowing out weaker
arguments on appeal and focusing on one central issue if possible."2" While
such streamlining may make a jurist's work easier and may even be appropriate in non-capital cases, it is deadly advice in a capital case and absolutely
no attention should be paid to the Fourth Circuit dicta.
Two primary reasons exist for a rule of total inclusion when assigning
errors during the appellate process. First, any claim not raised below will
not be considered above. Second, but related to the first, it is impossible to
tell which claim might later be deemed meritorious by a court in the federal
system, no matter how many times the claim has been turned down at the
state level. An example of this pattern would be Simmons v. South
Carolina,2 which held that a defendant had the right to inform the jury of
his ineligibility for parole. This issue had been repeatedly denied by state
courts as a matter of course, but was finally accepted on certiorari by the
United States Supreme Court and overturned. As long as the issue is preserved, the defendant may take advantage of any positive ruling while his
case is at trial or on direct appeal. An example of a current issue repeatedly
denied at the state level but ripe for reversal by the United States Supreme
Court is the application of the narrowing construction of the aggravating
factor of vileness.22

17.
SeeAnders, 386 U.S. at 744.
18.
Fry, 1998 WL 746859, at *4-5.
19. Id.
20. Id., at *5 (citingJonesv. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
21.
512 U.S. 154 (1994).
22. See Matthew K. Mahoney, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 457 (1999) (analyzing Reid
v. Commonwealth, 506 S.E.2d 787 (Va. 1998)).
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B. Guilty Pleas in Cases Involving Inflammatory Circumstances
Faced with a case involving inflammatory circumstances, a guilty plea
and call for mercy may seem reasonable. It is these very cases, however,
that should either be concluded by a non-capital plea agreement or brought
to a jury. A guilty plea eliminates and procedurally bars virtually all appellate issues once the plea has been accepted and a death sentence imposed.
The benefits of a plea are often outweighed by the number of rights forfeited. No guilty plea should be entered without a strong formal or very
strong informal indication from the judge that the sentence will not be
death. Especially in what appears to be an aggravated case, there is little
reason to believe that a judge who will not give any assurance that the death
penalty will not be imposed is a better choice than a full scale defense.
Having said that, not all matters are foreclosed by a plea of guilty. The
Fourth Circuit's decision cited the Supreme Court of Virginia's summary
denial at the state habeas level, in which the Supreme Court of Virginia cited
Peyton v. King 3 for the proposition that all non-jurisdictional challenges to
a conviction are waived when the defendant voluntarily enters a plea of
guilty.24 This statement is not as broad and all inclusive as a first reading
may appear. While a guilty plea does foreclose numerous possible appellate
issues, an admission of guilt is obviously not a waiver of claims or an acceptance of unlawful sentencing procedures. Should a guilty plea be absolutely
necessary, a sentence of death may still be challenged based on errors occurring at the sentencing phase of the trial. The Supreme Court of Virginia's
proportionality review may also be challenged.2
Matthew K. Mahoney

23.
169 S.E.2d 569 (Va. 1969).
24.
Fry, 1998 WL 746859, at *2. See Peyton v. King, 169 S.E.2d 569, 571 (Va. 1969).
See Alix M. Karl, Case Note, 11 CAP. DEF. J. 449 (1999) (analyzing Payne v.
25.
Commonwealth, 509 S.E.2d 293 (4th Cir. 1999) and Jason L. Solomon, Case Note, 11 CAP.
DEF. J. 197 (1998) (analyzing Jackson v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 538 (Va. 1998)).

